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Abstract 
A country’s Budget is one of the most important public policy instruments, as it establishes 
the government’s policy priorities and has the potential to determine winners and losers. The 
Budget, however, is a mixture of different components and these get varying degrees of 
attention in the media. Drawing on sociology of news research, this paper seeks to explain 
this heterogeneous coverage of a Budget’s policy decisions.  To do so, it uses a unique 
dataset of over 5,000 articles of press coverage of six UK Budgets (2008-2012). These 
articles are coded for the presence/absence of each of the Budget’s policy decision, via 
automated content analysis. Based on a multivariate negative binomial model we find that the 
salience of a policy decision in the coverage is determined by its cost; whether it is negative 
(i.e. tax hikes and spending cuts) or positive; the income group that is most affected by it; and 
the level of attention given to it by the government.  
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Introduction 
The Budget presentation and approval process is a key element of the policy process. 
Budgets allow governments to establish and publicize their key priorities (Walgrave, Varone 
and Dumont 2006), even if they only have the ability to make marginal changes (Wildavsky 
1964). Similarly, they can help the opposition in scoring political points, especially if the 
opposition is on the side of public opinion (Burstein 2003; Stimsom 2004). Furthermore, the 
public policy impact of the Budget cannot be denied, as well as its direct and indirect 
influence on voters (Whitten and Williams 2011). In the end, these political and policy 
dynamics make the act of presenting the Budget a highly mediatized event, even if—as we 
shall see—not all policy decisions receive the same degree of media coverage, or in some 
cases coverage at all. 
So far, there has been considerable research into the Budget, including on how it is 
explained by paradigms of policy change and different causal mechanisms (Esser, Reinemann 
and Fan 2000; Waisbord 2011), the impact it has for different governing areas (John 2006; 
King 1998), the budgetary process and its outcomes (Molander 2001; Wagschal and 
Wenzelburger 2008) and on the strategic nature of the Budget itself (Alt and Chrystal 1981). 
However, given the high impact that budgets can have for a country and its politics, it is 
surprising that little has been devoted to the media coverage. This is the more important 
because, as research has consistently shown, the politics of attention are crucial (Baumgartner 
and Jones 2005), and the media—for whom, as for other actors, attention is scarce—often 
plays a key role in these dynamics. Moreover, previous research has found that the media is 
highly selective about which aspects of the policy process it reports (Van Aelst et al. n/d).  
In the case of the Budget, the issues that it covers are evidently already on the policy 
agenda. Increases and decreases in budgetary spending, for instance, are tied to issue 
preferences of legislators (Mortensen 2009), even if these are constrained (Epp, Lovett and 
  
Baumgartner 2014). Which of these policy initiatives, however, does the public get to know 
about? We argue that the issues that remain on the agenda, and those that disappear into the 
background, will partly depend on the degree of coverage. Moreover, this will be tied to how 
attractive different policy decisions are for the media. As such, it is important to understand: 
which items of the Budget do the media pay attention to? And how can this be explained?  
In order to answer these questions, this paper draws on research on news values as 
well as commercial imperatives and media-source relations to explore the ‘selection bias’ of 
the media reporting of the Budget in the UK. Specifically, the paper will identify the key 
determinants that explain the difference in the amount of coverage allocated to different types 
of policy decisions presented in the Budget: from increases in direct taxes such as VAT to the 
reduction of corporation tax to changes in benefit indexation mechanisms. Using automated 
content analysis, this study analyses over 5,000 articles of press coverage of six Budgets, 
from 2008 to 2012 (with two in 2010); three during a Labour government and three during 
the Conservative-Liberal-Democrat coalition government. We then use media, policy and 
government communication variables in a multiple regression model to explain the variation 
in the coverage of the different components of the Budget.    
This paper will be organized as follows: the first section will discuss the role of the 
media in the policy process and the factors that shape news coverage. This will be followed 
by the presentation of our hypotheses. The third section explains the data collected, the 
process of automated text coding, and our dependent and independent variables. This will be 
followed by section four, in which we present our results, and section five which summarizes 
our conclusions and suggests several avenues for further research. 
 
 
 
  
The Media and Public Policy  
What the media does (not) cover can matter a great deal in the policy process. For a 
long time, research emphasis has been on the media’s influence over public opinion; for 
instance, we know that the media affects perceptions of the economy (Duch, Sagarzazu and 
Meddaugh 2011; Goidel and Langley 1995; Harrington 1989; Holbrook and Garand 1996). 
Moreover, research on agenda setting and priming indicates not only that the media’s 
priorities affect those of the public, but also that parties and political representatives are more 
likely to be assessed on issues that are highlighted in the media (McCombs and Shaw 1972; 
Price and Tewksbury 1997; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Weaver 1996; Weaver, 
McCombs and Shaw 2004). But recently it has also become clear that the media can more 
directly affect the policy process. Changes in salience, tone, and framing of coverage have 
been associated with policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 2005; Bonafont and 
Baumgartner 2013; John 2006; John et al. 2013; Rose and Baumgartner 2013; Soroka 2002; 
Walgrave, Nuytemans and Soroka 2008). In addition, research has shown not only that 
government and opposition often respond to the news agenda (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 
2010; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2010; Walgrave, Nuytemans and Soroka 2008) but also that 
news attention structures issue competition, influencing which issues are the subject of 
dialogue between opposition and government (Thesen 2011, 27). This is not just about 
symbolic reactions, however. Issues that the media pick up are more likely to create positive 
feedback into the policy cycle and hence be subject to more policy attention (Wolfe, Jones 
and Baumgartner 2013). Moreover, media attention to issues can help actors to politicize 
issues and, crucially, lack of media attention can help actors in trying to de-politicize them 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2005; Boydstun 2013).   
So, clearly the media are important, but what do we know about what they do and 
why? The question of what shapes media coverage, and specifically why certain events and 
  
issues receive more news attention than others, has been a key preoccupation of media and 
political communications scholars for decades (e.g. Gans 2004; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; 
Tuchman 1978; White 1950). However, despite the accumulated evidence of the importance 
of news values and other factors in affecting what (does not) get media attention, the 
determinants that explain the coverage of domestic policy—let alone fiscal policy and more 
specifically the Budget—have been generally understudied. This is surprising as the Budget 
is undoubtedly of key importance as the main instrument for setting—as well as giving 
publicity to—the country’s fiscal, and to an extent economic, policy for the next three to five 
years. 
In public policy, there have been several studies that demonstrate the significance of 
ideas and discourse in the success or failure of policy measures (Cox 2001; Green-Pedersen 
2002; Schmidt 2002), and even some that specifically emphasize the importance of political 
communication (Hood 2010; Wenzelburger 2011). But these mostly analyze government 
strategy and discourse, and in some cases public opinion data, where the media hardly 
figures. In studies of policy agendas and communication agenda setting (i.e. influence from 
the media’s to the public’s priorities), the media’s agenda is treated as independent variable, 
and hence generally left unexplored. On the other hand, studies of media and political agenda 
setting interactions explore whether media coverage is influenced by the political agenda (and 
vice versa), but generally do not try aim to uncover the influence of other factors in the media 
coverage (for overviews see Boydstun 2013; Van Aelst et al. 2014; Walgrave and Van Aelst 
2006). Similarly, although there are, as mentioned above, studies (e.g. Baumgartner and 
Jones 2005; John 2006; John et al. 2013) that do incorporate dynamics of media attention as 
explanatory variables for policy change (including budgetary re-allocation), they do not try to 
explain which factors led to the coverage in the first place. 
  
Within the media and sociological literatures, however, there is a strong body of 
literature which provides in-depth understanding of the different actors and dynamics that 
influence what appears in the news and how it is presented (e.g. Gandy 1982; Gans 2004; 
Golding and Elliott 1979; Schlesinger 1978; Tuchman 1978). These studies tend to analyze 
the news agenda in general and as such lack detail and specificity about the coverage of the 
policy process. They do, nonetheless, provide crucial insights into the influence of different 
factors—including news values—on the work of journalists, which will be discussed below.  
There have also been a number studies that focus on particular events or issues, but they have 
predominantly been about international event news, from elections to terrorism to national 
disasters to human right violations (Caliendo, Gibney and Payne 1999; Golan and Wanta 
2003; Jones, Van Aelst and Vliegenthart 2011; Koopmans and Vliegenthart 2011; 
Shoemaker, Chang and Brendlinger 1986; Wu 2007). On the other hand, the studies on 
domestic issues news have tended to concentrate heavily on protest (Oliver and Maney 2000; 
Oliver and Myers 1999) and crime (Buckler and Travis 2005; Pritchard and Hughes 1997) or 
on the relative visibility of specific political actors (e.g. Schoenbach, De Ridder and Lauf 
2001; Squire 1988; Tresch 2009). The few that focus on domestic policy do so by comparing 
news about the economy vis-à-vis objective economic indicators in the US (Fogarty 2005; 
Harrington 1989; Soroka 2002), explaining aggregate patterns of attention across major 
policy issues (Boydstun 2013), analyzing the degree of media attention to two policy 
decisions about welfare cuts (Lindbom 2010), the evolution over time of the coverage of the 
UK Community Charge, known as the ‘poll tax’ (Deacon and Golding 1994), and the 
determinants of coverage of policy via analysis of legislative proposals (Van Aelst et al. n/d). 
While these studies have identified a range of key factors that shape coverage, including the 
importance of news values and sources and their communication strategies (most importantly 
  
the government), they have left explanations of the coverage of fiscal policy—and most 
specifically the Budget—relatively unexplored. 
In combination, however, what this research does tell us is that media coverage is 
generally fairly predictable and that it can be explained by a range of key determinants. 
Although initially media research placed a lot of emphasis on the influence of the individual 
preferences of journalists—and especially editors—in deciding what news was, over time it 
became clear that there are a range of influential factors, most of which are structural (both to 
do with media institutions and political and economic variables) rather than individual. 
Among them, one of the key considerations is shared professional understandings of 
newsworthiness and the news values that underpin them. ‘News values refer to common 
views, particularly among journalists, about what is believed to be intrinsically relevant and 
interesting for the public (McQuail, 1993)’ (Van Aelst et al. n/d, 4). To be clear, news values 
are not the only influences on news selection: economic, political and organizational factors, 
as well as ideology, also come into play .(Golding and Elliott 1979; O’Neill and Harcup 
2009; Shoemaker and Reese 2013). Moreover, news values are not devoid of subjectivity nor 
are they straightforward to operationalize. But, nonetheless, it is clear from the literature that 
news values do matter and that there are certain characteristics of events and issues, or the 
countries where they take place, that increase/decrease their potential for news coverage. In 
the next section, drawing on studies of news values as well as the broader literature on 
sociology of news, we discuss how known determinants of media coverage can be applied to 
the UK Budget and present our hypotheses. 
Determinants of media coverage and hypotheses  
Many studies, especially in international news, have tried to operationalize and test 
the concept of news values (e.g. Adams 1986; Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger 1987; 
Weber 2010). In fact there are several lists of criteria and many are rather extensive, which 
  
can be problematic, especially for empirical testing (Harcup and O’Neill 2001; O’Neill and 
Harcup 2009). Here we focus on news values that have been repeatedly identified across key 
studies (Golding and Elliott 1979; Harcup and O’Neill 2001; O’Neill and Harcup 2009; 
Shoemaker and Reese 2013) and that for both theoretical relevance and matters of 
operationalization are most relevant to this paper, given its focus on fiscal policy coverage.  
The first of these news criteria is magnitude or size. The idea is that the greater the 
magnitude of a ‘happening’, the more the media is likely to cover it. As studies on fiscal 
policy are lacking, there is no specific evidence of how this criteria applies in such a context. 
But this news value has indeed been found to be significant in a range of topics. Research has 
repeatedly shown that how much coverage an event abroad gets (e.g. natural disasters, 
elections, human right abuses) will be in part determined by the magnitude of what took place 
such as intensity of the earthquake or number protesters2 as well as—among other factors—
the size of the country that the news refer to, measured by e.g. population, surface area, GDP 
or share of international trade (for a meta-analysis see Wu 2000). As applied to our study, we 
operationalize magnitude as a matter of cost. So we hypothesize that:  
H1 Magnitude: the larger the cost of the policy decision for the Treasury, the more 
the media will cover it.  
The second news value is timeliness, which refers to events that are ‘close to us in 
time’ (Shoemaker and Reese 2013, 107). Timeliness is considered to increase 
newsworthiness because ‘[w]e have limited attention and want to know what's happening 
                                                
2  More specifically, for instance Oliver and Myers (1999) found in their study of media and protest 
that the size of the event (measured by the number of demonstrators) influenced the degree of 
coverage, with larger ones receiving greater attention. Similarly, Koopmans and Vliegenthart (2011, 
645) found that both the number of deaths and the earthquake’s magnitude on the Richter scale had an 
effect on the degree of media attention. 
  
now. Timely events are also more likely to require action’ (Shoemaker and Reese 2013, 171). 
Interestingly, although this is seemingly a rather self-evident criteria for influencing news 
coverage, it is not one that has much been empirically tested, perhaps precisely because of its 
apparent obviousness. The Budget is in this regard, however, rather atypical because although 
the event of unveiling it is clearly timely, policy decisions are scheduled to come into effect 
at  a number of distinct time points (ranging from now to five years). So, whether or not this 
has an impact needs to be tested. Based on the news value of timeliness, we hypothesize that:  
H2 Timeliness: the more immediate the impact of the policy decision, the more the 
media will cover it.  
The third news value we incorporated in our model is negativity, which has long been 
considered a key criteria (Shoemaker and Reese 2013, 53-4) based on the idea that ‘bad news 
sells’ (Golding and Elliott 1979). It has also been particularly associated with economic 
news, where studies have found that ‘negative trends regularly get more coverage than 
positive trends’ (Soroka 2012, 521) and that the media overemphasizes the negative when the 
economy is doing poorly but not the positive when it is doing well (Fogarty 2005, 165). In 
relation to the Budget, negative news can be defined as policy decisions that reduce people’s 
disposable income and the benefits and services they receive from the state. So we 
hypothesise that:  
H3 Negativity: policy decisions that announce cuts in spending and tax increases will 
be covered more than increases in spending and tax cuts.  
Related to size or magnitude, theories of news values also suggest that journalists are 
more likely to write about ‘happenings’ that are of interest to many people (Strömbäck, 
Karlsson and Hopmann 2012). The implication is thus that the greater the number of people 
affected by it (a policy decision in this case), the more coverage it should receive. It might 
not be so simple, however. The public here can be defined by its size but also in general 
  
terms (as in relevant to the ‘public interest’) or as specific readership profiles. It is well 
known that commercial imperatives shape journalists’ work, especially (assumed) audience 
interests and competences (Deacon and Golding 1994). Moreover, as newspapers are profit-
seeking organizations, every potential reader might not have the same ‘value’, depending on 
the paper’s target readership as well as their marketability for advertisers (Hamilton 2003). 
Furthermore, as suggested by Gans (2004, 151) this judgement might also be affected by 
journalists’ background: more coverage might be given to decisions that affect the middle 
class, to which most journalists belong. Indeed, studies about crime coverage across countries 
have repeatedly found that crimes affecting the white middle-classes get more attention (for 
an overview see Lawrence and Mueller 2003). Similarly, Waisbord (2011, 153) found that 
issues affecting urban school systems used by the middle-classes are considered more 
newsworthy than those in deprived rural areas.  
The issue here is that news values interact with commercial imperatives and other 
organizational factors, often producing a gap between what journalists normatively might 
think should be the most important event properties in deciding what is news (especially 
relevance to the ‘public interest’) and what they are in practice (Strömbäck, Karlsson and 
Hopmann 2012, 722). Following this, our hypothesis states that:   
H4 Middle class: policy decisions that affect the middle class will be covered more 
than those covering other social classes or than administrative policy decisions that do not 
affect any particular group.  
Following on from this, we also tested a second variable that combines news values 
with commercial imperatives: the impact on the degree of coverage of whether policy 
decisions affected mostly businesses or individual citizens. As explained above, the 
expectation is that the number of people directly affected and target readership of the paper 
will affect how much coverage an event (in our case the Budget measure) receives. This is 
  
anticipated to be the case even though some policy decisions primarily affecting businesses 
might have stronger effects on the distribution of wealth and on the economy at large, and 
hence have a greater impact on the public interest. Applied to our study, given that the 
readership of all the papers bar the Financial Times is non-specialised, the hypothesis states 
that: 
H5 readership: policy decisions affecting primarily businesses will receive less 
coverage than those primarily affecting individuals  
The final news value we incorporated in our model is the involvement of elites, 
specifically here government officials, which has long been considered a crucial determinant 
of media coverage. There are two interrelated aspects to this. On the one hand, it is about 
elites as subjects: events associated with ‘important people’, regarded as such either because 
of their role in society and/or because of their celebrity status, have been shown to be 
considered more newsworthy (O’Neill and Harcup 2009; Shoemaker and Reese 2013; 
Strömbäck, Karlsson and Hopmann 2012). Specifically in relation to the policy process, 
‘journalists report about what political elites are doing or planning to do, often ignoring other 
policy actors who are deemed to be less newsworthy than “officials”’ (Baumgartner and 
Bonafont 2015, 1). On the other hand, the involvement of elites is also important in their 
roles as sources. Due to organizational factors and professional norms, source considerations 
are crucial (Gans 2004) and, in this regard, the literature has consistently pointed at the 
influence of official sources, most especially government actors (for an overview see Bennett 
and Livingston 2003). Journalists often take the lead from government officials about what is 
most important. This is a result of both the fact that patterns of media attention are shaped by 
government attention (Bonafont and Baumgartner 2013; Boydstun 2013) and the more direct 
influence of information subsidies from a source that has both high media capital and media-
source affinity (Davis 2000). Specifically in relation to our study, it is the case that the 
  
Budget announcement involves elites, specifically the Chancellor,3 in all its measures; hence 
in this regard involvement of elites can be considered a constant. But if a particular measure 
is highlighted by government communication, both due to news values and source 
considerations, it is expected to get more media attention4. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H6 official sources: the more a policy decision is emphasised in government 
communications (Budget executive report and press notices), the more coverage the media 
will give to it. 
Identifying Newspaper Coverage of the Budget 
In the previous sections we presented our expectations regarding the visibility of the 
different policy decisions in media coverage of the Budget. In this section we describe the 
data collected to test our theoretical claims. First, we explain the newspaper data. Secondly, 
we describe how we used the policy decisions to generate a coding dictionary. Third, we 
explain how we coded the articles and performed reliability tests. Finally, we discuss our 
dependent and independent variables. 
Budget articles 
In order to identify how much the press covered each of the Budget measures, we 
downloaded articles from six British newspapers.  We chose the print media not only due to 
ease of access but also because, given strict impartiality rules in broadcasting, the press is a 
more varied forum of national debate (Kuhn 2007). Moreover, the press has been found to 
                                                
3 The Chancellor of the Exchequer is the top cabinet position in charge of financial matters. 
Sh/e has overall responsibility for the work of the Treasury, including the Budget.  
4 As discussed in the literature review, the relationship has also been found to apply in the 
other direction: media coverage affecting the degree of attention paid to issues by both 
government and opposition. This is not something, however, that can be tested with the data 
analyzed here.  
  
have intra-media agenda setting influence, including on that of TV news shows (Vliegenthart 
and Walgrave 2008, 862). 
All major daily national newspapers were included, hence covering both tabloids and 
broadsheets and different partisan and ideological positions. It thus enabled us to compare 
newspaper types, which are assumed, and indeed have been found by some studies, to differ 
in their criteria of newsworthiness (Deacon and Golding 1994; Harcup and O’Neill 2001). 
Specifically we included the broadsheets: The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, 
and the Financial Times; and the tabloids: The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, and The Sun. In 
terms of ownership, two of these newspapers (The Sun and The Times) are owned by Rupert 
Murdoch’s News International – organization considered to be of center-right ideological 
orientation (Esser, Reinemann and Fan 2000)-; none of the others are owned by the same 
conglomerate.  
The articles were identified using Newsbank with the key word ‘budget’5. The 
samples covered one full working week (Sundays excluded) starting the day after the Budget 
was announced. The short timeframe allows us to focus on Budget-specific stories. We 
focused on the London editions because this is the only one that all newspapers have. After 
manually cleaning for duplicates, we identified a total of 5,501 unique newspaper articles for 
the six years. As shown in table 1, there are—on average—about 900 articles per Budget; 
tabloids have a significantly lower number of articles than broadsheets, which is expected due 
to their weaker focus on public affairs and smaller pagination. 
<TABLE 1> 
Coding policy decisions 
The UK Budget is generally structured around two reports: (1) an economic and fiscal 
strategy report and (2) a financial statement and Budget report. While the former focuses on 
                                                
5 To obtain the Daily Mail articles we used the same search but through the Lexis Nexis database. 
  
how the measures and decisions announced in the Budget help advance the Government’s 
long-term goals, the latter ‘brings together in summary form all the measures and decisions 
that affect the Budget arithmetic’ either in the form of revenues or spending (Budget 2008, p. 
109).6 These ‘policy decisions’ are then the main feature of the UK Budget and the focus of 
our paper. 
For the purpose of this analysis, we used the policy decisions listed as such in the 
Budget’s official documents. However, we only included decisions: i) made in the Budget 
under study and ii) with costed budgetary impact; hence we excluded policy plans without 
monetary quantification and decisions carried on from a previous Budget. Following these 
criteria, we identified 299 policy decisions over the six Budgets under study.7  
In order to code how many of the 5,000+ articles in our sample covered the policy 
decisions of the respective Budgets, we took advantage of dictionary coding. Dictionary 
coding is a particular type of quantitative text analysis. It links specific words to 
predetermined categories, be they policy positions (Laver and Garry 2000), issue areas 
(Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu n/d), or more complex measures such as assuredness and 
tentativeness (Hart and Childers 2005). The main advantage of this tool is that it enables 
researchers to code a larger number of documents and do so with a stronger degree of 
reliability than hand-coding provides (Mikhaylov, Laver and Benoit 2012).  
                                                
6 ‘These include tax measures, national insurance contributions (NICs) measures, measures that affect 
Annually Managed Expenditure (AME), and additions to Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL)’ 
(Budget 2008, 109). 
7 Policy decision #23 of the 2008 budget was removed due to its high overlap with a policy decision 
emanating from 2007. Similarly, policy decision #19 of the 2008 budget was removed due to the 
limited information provided for it in the budget together with the fact that, in abstract, it duplicated 
other PDs from the same budget (#17, 18 and 20). 
  
To build our dictionary we took the tokens (both words and numbers) that were 
mentioned in the different policy decisions. These tokens were stemmed (words) and 
normalized (for different representations of the same numerical concept, i.e. 2%, 2pct).  Once 
this was done our dictionary had 1,279 unique terms of which 1,146 were word stems and 
133 were numbers. Based on these terms we classified the different articles. Because these 
computerized methods, in this case in particular a dictionary, can suffer of lack of validity 
(Grimmer and Stewart 2013) we tested its validity by comparing the results with a hand-
coded random sample of 235 articles. These articles were manually coded for the 
presence/absence of references to each policy decision, and then we compared our two 
measures to check their validity. In our test we correctly coded 98.3% of our sample. 
Furthermore, we also estimated the correlation (r = .61, p < .001) of our dictionary compared 
to the hand coded measure; the largely cross validate each other. The online appendix 
describes in further detail the process we used to build our dictionary and classify the texts, as 
well as the validity test performed. 
Figure 1 shows the total number of articles reporting at least one policy decision as a 
percentage of all the articles in the dataset. As can be seen, on average 30% of tabloid articles 
and about 40% of broadsheet articles in our sample (returned with the search string ‘budget’) 
referred to specific policy decisions. 
<FIGURE 1> 
As expected, coverage of policy decisions is not homogenous: while some receive 
zero mentions others are mentioned in 200 articles. On average an individual policy decision 
is mentioned in 21 articles. This of course also varies by Budgets; for instance, the 2008 
Budget has the lowest average with 13 articles per policy decision, while the first coalition 
Budget has the most with 32. On average tax and transfer policy decisions are mentioned 
similarly (23 and 21 articles respectively), while policy decisions regarding other 
  
administrative measures receive the least attention (6 articles). This, however, also varies: the 
2008 Budget has the highest average mentions of transfers and the 2010 coalition Budget has 
the highest average mentions for taxes (See figure 3). This variation in attention makes this 
study of the causes for this heterogeneity of attention to the different policy decisions highly 
significant. 
<FIGURE 3> 
 
Variables 
The dependent variable was the number of articles that mentioned each of the policy 
decisions (PDs). Data was then aggregated simultaneously by policy decision and newspaper, 
resulting in a pooled dataset of 2,000 observations of the dependent variable. We considered 
the possibility of also trying to establish prominence, based on the placement of the piece 
(e.g. front page) and number and location of the references to the PDs. However, given the 
limited information available in the databases about page numbers and the characteristics of 
our methodology, this would not have been achievable. This is not a major limitation, 
however, because other studies have found that using both types of measure produced very 
similar results (Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2007). 
 Each policy decision was coded for several independent variables, following our 
hypotheses. Firstly, we used estimated policy costings based on the governments' figures. 
Whilst both Labour and the coalition government used the National Accounts basis, 
consistency across all six Budgets required us to make two choices. First, static costings were 
chosen, rather than post-behavioural ones. Static costings do not generally take into account 
projected changes in the behaviour of taxpayers or social security claimants, in response 
to the policy decisions in question (e.g. changes in how much such individuals work, as a 
results of changes in minimum wage or welfare payments, etc.). Although limited in some 
  
regards, it is more reliable than trying to predict behavioural changes. Second, indexed 
costings were used, rather than non-indexed ones. This means that, in calculating a policy 
decision’s net Exchequer impact, it was assumed that the relevant pre-policy decision fixed-
amount tax or benefit regime (e.g. the personal allowance, benefit amounts, etc.) would have 
kept pace with inflation, even without the policy decision in question.8 
These policy costings were used for three variables. For the variable magnitude 
(hypothesis 1), we added all years and transformed the sum into absolute numbers. Following 
standard practice, as these figures were highly skewed, they were log-transformed so that 
they had a normal distribution in the regression analysis. For timeliness (hypothesis 2), we 
coded for whether the financial impact started in the fiscal year of the Budget (0), in the 
following year (1), or beyond (2). For hypothesis 3, we used the sign of the costing (i.e. 
whether it entailed savings or spending for the Exchequer) combined with type (described 
below) to code for negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (1) news.  
In order to identify which income groups were most affected (hypothesis 4) by each 
policy decision (i.e. according to income groups, and businesses vs. individuals), we coded 
policy decisions based on whether they affected the poor (specifically the two lower income 
deciles as defined by the Office of National Statistics)9, the middle class (median-income 
households), the rich (the highest income decile), or none of the three in particular (for 
instance, administrative policy decisions). Similarly, to identify which policy decisions target 
                                                
8 See Budget 2008 at A.2.2-A.2.5, Budget 2009 at A.188-A.192, Budget March 2010 A.204-A.209, 
Budget June 2010 Policy Costings at 1.13-1.16, and Annex A and references to static costing 
throughout Budget 2011 Policy Costings and Budget 2012 Policy Costings.  
9 See for instance http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/business-transparency/freedom-of-
information/what-can-i-request/published-ad-hoc-data/econ/january-2014/household-income-and-
expenditure-by-income-decile-group---2012.xls 
  
businesses (hypothesis 5) it was determined whether the policy decision directly affects 
mostly businesses (including sole traders).10 The variable was coded according to the actual, 
rather than formal, economic incidence of each policy decision; in the case of taxes, for 
instance, this is to say, anyone who is out of pocket as a result of the imposition of the tax, 
rather than only those who have the actual legal liability for paying the tax (Kay and King 
1990, 6).  
For government attention (hypothesis 6), we coded, using the same dictionary and 
criteria for inclusion, the presence/absence of each policy decision in the Treasury’s press 
notices and in the Chancellor’s speech in the House of Commons. If present in one of them, 
we coded as 1, if in both as 2, and 0 if not present.  Given the different strategies for specific 
years, we proceed to normalize this variable for the year by estimating how differently policy 
decisions were mentioned versus the mean mention for the year. 
In addition, we created a set of control variables. First, we differentiated policy 
decisions as to whether they announced taxes, transfers, or other measures (essentially 
administrative and miscellaneous); we set taxes as our control category. Second, we 
generated a dummy variable to identify a Labour government (1) versus a Conservative 
government (0) and another one to identify ideology, i.e. whether the source was left leaning 
(1) for the Daily Mirror and The Guardian or not (0) for the other four titles. Finally, in the 
full model we controlled for differences in newspaper types with a dichotomous variable 
identifying whether a source was a tabloid (1) or a broadsheet (0), and with dummies for the 
different budgets. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for all variables.  
<TABLE 2> 
Having defined all variables, we can proceed to our analysis. As we discussed earlier, 
the dependent variable is a count of the number of articles in a newspaper mentioning a 
                                                
10 A research assistant, with expertise in Tax law, performed the coding. 
  
policy decision. As such, given the non-negative integer nature of our variable, a count model 
needs to be used (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). Within this family of models, we specifically 
chose to use a Negative Binomial regression given that—since the sample variance exceeds 
the sample mean—this model is more efficient compared to the Poisson regression (Long 
1997).   
Results 
For the multiple regressions we ran three separate models: one for the whole sample 
and two models for the sample split by type of newspaper11. As can be seen in Table 3, the 
full model shows—as expected—that tabloids have given the Budget less coverage overall 
than broadsheets. Regardless of this disparity, the main point to note is that, although there 
are some differences between the models that will be discussed below, the coverage in both 
types of newspapers is largely driven by the same explanatory variables. In other words, both 
types of newspapers appear to be affected by the same factors in their news selection. 
Reinforcing this indication of commonality across newspaper types, neither the party in 
government nor ideological leaning were statistically significant. Given our methodology, we 
obviously cannot speak to the tone of the coverage; but in terms of salience this result 
indicates that, despite the marked partisanship of British newspapers, they all focus their 
attention on the same policy decisions, regardless of editorial ideological leaning and which 
government is in charge (ceteris paribus).  
                                                
11 Given patterns of ownership (see p. 13), we ran a separate model to test whether our results where 
different for newspapers owned by News International versus the other newspapers, and we compared 
this to our full model. The results (available on request) were consistent with the models presented 
here, except that the coefficient of the variable for policy decisions targeting businesses (hypothesis 5) 
loses significance. Nonetheless, the sign is the same (negative) and it is similar to the results of our 
only tabloids model where the coefficient is also non-significant. 
  
In regard to our hypotheses, most of them have been confirmed, although there are 
also some interesting exceptions. Regarding hypothesis 1, which refers to magnitude, it is 
clear that the monetary value of the policy greatly matters. The relationship is significant and 
in the expected direction: the greater the cost (whether saving or spending for the Exchequer), 
the greater the number of articles that discussed it. For example, an additional £3,792.95 
(million) in the cost of a policy decision (one standard deviation) is associated with an 
increase in coverage of 5 articles.  
The second hypothesis referred to timeliness, the assumption being that policy 
decisions that have more immediate effect would receive more coverage than those with 
deferred implementation. Interestingly, this variable is significant for all three models but in 
the opposite direction to what we expected: the later a policy decision comes into effect (i.e. 
starting in year 2 or 3), the more coverage it receives. We do not have a clear explanation for 
this yet but the fact that policy decisions resulting in more structural change, which do not 
necessarily correlate with cost, have deferred implementation is—we suspect—at least part of 
the answer.  
The third hypothesis referred to negativity, which has long been considered a key 
news value and indeed the data provides support for hypothesis 3. This variable, coded to 
include tax increases and spending cuts, was significant for all three models. This is to say 
that, even when controlling for other variables including economic costing, negative policy 
measures defined as above received more coverage than positive ones (i.e. tax cuts and 
spending increases) in both tabloids and broadsheets.  
<TABLE 3> 
The next hypotheses combined news values with commercial imperatives. We 
hypothesize that not all income groups matter the same for newspapers. The data shows that 
there is indeed a stronger focus on what matters for the middle classes, especially by 
  
broadsheets. On average, policy decisions affecting them received more coverage.12 
However, interestingly, in tabloids the policy decisions affecting mostly the poor received 
almost as much attention as those for the middle classes. This is significant while controlling 
for type of policy decision, so it is not a result of tabloids’ ‘obsession’ with welfare ‘hand-
outs’, but an indication of their target readership, and what is assumed to be their (self) 
interest, and hence of the importance of market considerations in shaping the coverage. We 
also tested to see whether policy decisions focusing on businesses, and hence directly 
affecting a smaller target audience, would receive less coverage. This was indeed confirmed 
by the data: corporate policy decisions are, ceteris paribus, considered less newsworthy.  
The final hypothesis about the role of official sources was also confirmed: policy 
decisions highlighted in government communications via the Chancellor’s speech and press 
notices received greater coverage in the media. This is of course while controlling for all 
other relevant factors, so it is not simply that these policy decisions are ‘objectively’ (e.g. 
cost) more important; instead, it suggests that the government’s communication influences 
which policy decisions the media give more salience to, because of the public interest value 
allocated to what the government says, as well as organizational and routine factors that 
encourage reliance on official sources,  
An interesting point to make regarding the attention the government gives to the 
different policy decisions is that while it matters, it is also conditional on the government’s 
selectiveness about which PDs to highlight. When we model government attention simply as 
the number of places where a policy decision is mentioned: none (0), both speech and press 
release (2), or in one of the two (1), we find not only a similar significance for the attention 
variable but a corrective negative impact on coverage during the Labour years. This is 
                                                
12 The coefficients for rich, poor, and middle classes are statistically significantly different from each 
other. Results will be made available upon request.  
  
because Labour's press notices were substantially longer and touched on a much larger 
number of policy decisions, suggesting that while government information subsidies work on 
shaping coverage, they do so only as long as they are focused.13 
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper analyzed the amount of press coverage for each of the policy decisions in 
six UK Budgets (2008-1012), providing not only data but also an original and useful 
framework for further research on a subject that has been clearly understudied. The analysis 
offers three main insights: ffirstly, it is clear that there is a huge disparity in the degree of 
coverage that different policy decisions receive; some are simply of no interest to the press, 
receiving no attention at all.  Secondly, the limited differences between the models and the 
lack of significance of two of the control variables shows that there is a remarkable 
commonality about the factors that explain the attention given by the press to the Budget’s 
policy decisions. This indicates that news values to a large extent transcend differences in 
type of newspaper, their ideological orientation and party/ies in power. Thirdly, the analysis 
confirmed most of our hypotheses about the factors that shape the salience given to each of 
the policy measures. This clearly suggests that the coverage of the Budget is highly 
predictable. In terms of news values directly associated with the policy decisions themselves, 
both magnitude (based on economic costing) and negativity (defined as tax hikes and 
spending cuts) were statistically significant and in the expected direction (i.e. more 
coverage). The fact that cost matters is perhaps not very surprising: the more money at stake, 
the more media interest it is likely to get. However, as Lindbom (2010) and Adams (1986) 
have argued, there are also other factors at play as well . Findings on negativity are consistent 
with previous literature, which have found negative developments to be more newsworthy 
(e.g. Golan and Wanta 2003), especially in economic news (Fogarty 2005; Soroka 2012). 
                                                
13 Results will be made available upon request. 
  
Immediacy, on the other hand, challenged our expectations: PDs with delayed 
implementation received more coverage.  
The relative salience of different measures in the coverage, however, was not 
explained just by properties of the policy decisions and their ‘inherent’ news value. In line 
with the literature, government influence also proved to be an important factor in explaining 
the attention to different measures. And so were commercial imperatives, and it is here that 
we see differences across newspaper types, because of differences in their target readerships. 
Moreover, it is these findings that raise normative issues about what the press covers and 
what it omits, and hence what citizens do (not) get to know about, most especially in relation 
to the low attention to what affects the rich and businesses, as well the poor. There was a 
general emphasis on policy decisions most directly affecting individuals, rather than 
businesses, which makes sense from a commercial point of view. From a normative point of 
view, however, it raises some questions about how well the general public is being informed 
about what are in many cases highly significant decisions, given their potential impact on the 
economy as a whole and for the redistribution of wealth (or rather lack thereof). A similar 
point can be made about the findings regarding target group. Focusing, as broadsheets did, on 
measures that affect the middle class is a sound commercial strategy, given the size of the 
group and their disposable income—and hence marketability for advertisers—compared to 
the poor. However, 'quality' newspapers overlooking the impact of the Budget on the poor 
raises normative questions about how well they serve the public interest. It also provides an 
interesting angle of support to arguments about the importance of universality in sustaining 
support for welfare provision. 
These ‘selection biases’ are key because of the potential impact they might have on 
both the political and the policy process. In terms of the former, this heterogeneity in 
coverage—and the fact it can be affected by the government—can have significant 
  
repercussions for accountability. This is the case because availability of information—or at 
the very least visibility—is crucial for attribution of responsibility, and hence credit claiming 
and blame avoidance (Powell and Whitten 1993). Moreover, in terms of the policy process, 
we know that policies that are ‘invisible’ to citizens (or that citizens are unaware of) are on 
the one hand tempting if the aim is to legislate by stealth (Pierson 1994)—such as in the case 
of cuts—and on the other, in the case of expenditure, gives elected representatives less 
incentive to implement them (Alt and Chrystal 1981). Altogether, this highlights the 
importance of studying the media coverage of policy and its determinants.   
The results also suggest several fruitful avenues for further research. The government 
is clearly a key actor but it would be interesting to explore the role of interest groups, 
opposition parties and think tanks, such as the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), in shaping 
media attention, especially if the timeframe was extended beyond the period immediately 
after the Budget announcements. Another avenue to expand upon would be to include 
different types of media, especially television, to uncover similarities and differences in the 
main determinants of attention to different policy decisions. Moreover, the study could be 
replicated in a comparative setting hence enabling us to test the validity of the conclusions in 
different policy, political and media systems.  
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Table 1. Number of articles by newspaper and budget 
 2008 2009 
March 
2010 
June 
2010 
2011 2012 Total 
Daily Mirror 35 30 16 38 30 48 197 
Daily Mail 136 63 125 101 115 100 640 
The Sun 59 50 42 43 44 43 281 
Telegraph 141 128 181 227 218 198 1,093 
Financial Times 151 201 158 183 174 155 1,022 
Guardian 174 265 225 196 262 244 1,366 
The Times 129 160 160 175 123 155 902 
Total 825 897 907 963 966 943 5,501 
 
 
  
  
Table 2.- Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Articles coded 2,000 3.483 6.293 0 66 
Cost (log) 2,000 4.666 2.794 -4.605 10.903 
Timeliness 2,000 0.645 0.759 0 2 
Negativity 2,000 -0.004 0.975 -1 1 
Social class affected: None 2,000 0.437 0.496 0 1 
Social class affected: Poor 2,000 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Social class affected: Middle 2,000 0.359 0.479 0 1 
Social class affected: Rich 2,000 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Business affected 2,000 0.617 0.486 0 1 
Government attention 2,000 0.000 0.517 -1.864 0.825 
Type: Tax 2,000 0.717 0.451 0 1 
Type: Transfer 2,000 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Type: Other 2,000 0.073 0.261 0 1 
Left leaning 2,000 0.299 0.457 0 1 
Labour government 2,000 0.516 0.499 0 1 
Tabloid 2,000 0.402 0.490 0 1 
Budget 1 2,000 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Budget 2 2,000 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Budget 3 2,000 0.135 0.341 0 1 
Budget 4 2,000 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Budget 5 2,000 0.199 0.399 0 1 
Budget 6 2,000 0.140 0.347 0 1 
 
 
     
  
  
Table 3.- Results from Negative Binomial Regression on Number of Articles Coded 
 ALL Tabloid Broadsheet 
Cost (log) 0.118*** 0.129*** 0.116*** 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) 
Timeliness 0.222*** 0.164* 0.243*** 
 (0.051) (0.089) (0.060) 
Negativity 0.153*** 0.114* 0.169*** 
 
(0.034) (0.060) (0.040) 
Social class affected [base = none]    
Poor 0.543*** 0.983*** 0.377** 
 
(0.137) (0.249) (0.160) 
Middle 0.758*** 1.158*** 0.599*** 
 
(0.081) (0.143) (0.097) 
Rich 0.415*** 0.502** 0.408*** 
 
(0.123) (0.221) (0.146) 
Business affected -0.242*** -0.144 -0.296*** 
 
(0.086) (0.146) (0.103) 
Government attention 1.313*** 1.124*** 1.387*** 
 
(0.073) (0.133) (0.086) 
Control variables:    
Type [base category=Tax]    
Transfer -0.371*** -0.201 -0.453*** 
(0.104) (0.182) (0.122) 
Other -1.114*** -1.600*** -1.022*** 
(0.142) (0.345) (0.161) 
Left leaning -0.186*** -0.819*** 0.108 
 
(0.066) (0.121) (0.081) 
Labour government -0.384*** -0.235 -0.444*** 
 
(0.115) (0.192) (0.138) 
Tabloid -1.415*** - - 
 
(0.066) - - 
Budget – 2009  0.435*** 0.160 0.494*** 
 (0.105) (0.176) (0.125) 
Budget – 2010a 0.506*** -0.217 0.759*** 
 (0.115) (0.227) (0.132) 
Budget – 2010b 0.084 -0.229 0.266* 
 (0.122) (0.222) (0.144) 
Budget – 2011  -0.269** -0.522*** -0.166 
 (0.109) (0.185) (0.131) 
Constant 0.560*** -0.836*** 0.523*** 
 
(0.156) (0.269) (0.185) 
Parameter α 0.116** -0.068 0.080 
 
(0.053) (0.125) (0.060) 
N 2000 804 1196 
Log Likelihood -3914.794 -1016.541 -2855.100 
AIC 7867.588 2069.083 5746.200 
  
Figure 1.- Percentage of articles coded with at least one policy decision, by budget and output 
type 
 
 
  
Figure 2.- Mean number of articles covering policy decisions based on type 
 
 
  
  
 
Appendix 1.- Example of Policy Decisions and Dictionary terms  
 
Budget Year: 2008 
Policy Decision: 1 Charities: gift aid transitional rate 
Additional information:  
Gift Aid A.39 With effect from 6 April 2008, charities will be able to claim Gift Aid at a 
transitional rate, consistent with a basic rate of income tax of 22 per cent, for three years. 
Dictionary words:  
able 
aid 
april 
basic 
business 
charities 
claim 
consistent 
effective 
gift 
rating 
taxes 
transitional 
22% 
Budget Year: 2011 
Policy Decision: 15 Stamp Duty Land Tax: bulk purchasing 
Additional Information: 2.155 Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT): reform of the rules for bulk 
purchases – The Government will introduce changes to the SDLT rules for bulk purchases of 
residential properties. If the buyer chooses, the rate of SDLT on purchases of multiple 
residential properties will be determined by the mean value of the dwellings purchased 
(subject to a minimum rate of 1 per cent), rather than their aggregate value as is currently the 
case. (Finance Bill 2011) 
Dictionary words:  
aggregate 
bulk 
buyers 
dutifully 
dwellings 
land 
means 
multiples 
property 
purchase 
residential 
stamped 
taxes 
1% 
 
 
 
  
Online appendix: Coding of Policy Decisions 
 
Our dictionary was created by first taking the words from the Budget, specifically the 
tables listing the policy decisions as well as the text describing each of these in more detail. 
Second, following standard quantitative text analysis practices (e.g. Klüver 2009; Proksch 
and Slapin 2010) we excluded stop-words and stemmed all terms (Porter 1980) to make sure 
we covered a wide range of uses of the words. Because of the importance of numbers to the 
policy decisions, we made sure to include them in our dictionary. While it is not a common 
approach to include numbers in quantitative text analyses, we did so because they can 
provide information unique to the different policy decisions. As such we treated numbers as 
tokens just as if they were a word. This, however, posed a challenge as they do not have a 
stem. Nonetheless, upon inspection of the texts we noticed different representations for the 
same concept; for instance two percent was found as 0.02, 2pct, and 2%. So, for each 
numerical term we used all these variations to increase the accuracy of our dictionary.  
Once this initial list of terms for each policy decision was made, we extended each to 
include synonyms of some of the key words. This is particularly important given the 
differences in languages between tabloids and broadsheets. In total our dictionary contained 
1,279 unique terms of which 1,146 were word stems and 133 were numbers. It is important to 
note that our dictionary does not place exclusivity between a term and a policy decision, and 
as such one term can be included in several policy decisions (for more details see Appendix). 
 
 
Coding the articles 
Once our dictionary was defined, we proceeded to code each newspaper article based 
on the number of terms associated with each policy decision that was present. This coding 
resulted in three specific measures for each article: 1) the simple count of unique terms in the 
  
article that were in the dictionary for each policy decision (repeated terms where counted as 
one); 2) the percentage of total words in the article that represented the terms from the policy 
decision; and 3) the average of the uniqueness of the terms from the policy decision present 
in the article. This latter measure is created from a uniqueness index of each term t which 
indicates the extent t is specific to a single policy decision p compared to the other policy 
decisions in the same Budget (i.e. if a term is unique to one PD in a given year uniqueness=1 
if it belongs to all PDs of the same year uniqueness=0).  
After coding the articles using the dictionary, we established a threshold for our three 
indicators. As such, for a policy decision to be coded present in the article it needed to 
include: 1) at least six unique words from the dictionary category; this means that almost 
50% of the unique dictionary words for a policy decision need to be present; 2) the total 
count of words of a policy decision present in the article needs to represent at least 2 per cent 
of the valid words of the article; 3) the average uniqueness score has to be higher than .2. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of articles by policy decisions for the three variables and the 
cut-off points. As can be seen, this threshold allowed us to be highly inclusive while at the 
same time controlling the presence of false positives and false negatives.14 
<FIGURE 1> 
In order to validate our dictionary, we proceeded to do a manual coding of a random 
sample of at least 5% of the articles for each newspaper-Budget combination. However, 
given the small number of articles for the tabloids, we oversampled these sources. This 
resulted in a sample of 385 articles. These articles were manually coded for the 
presence/absence of references to each policy decision, and then we compared our two 
measures to check their validity. Out of a total of 20,378 observations, we correctly coded 
                                                
14 We tested alternative thresholds; however, we found this was more accurate and we corroborated 
this against our hand-coded sample. 
  
20,037, i.e. 98.3% of our sample.15 Despite the high number of correctly predicted 
observations, we also estimated the correlation of our dictionary compared to the hand coded 
measure. The estimates correlate well (r = .61, p < .001) and therefore largely cross validate 
each other. As such, we are confident that our dictionary is properly identifying the presence 
and absence of policy decisions.  
  
                                                
15 We correctly coded the absence of a PD in 19,760 observations and the presence in 277. Our 
dictionary identified 172 observations which our manual coding didn’t and missed 169 observations. 
  
Figure 1. Distribution of articles based on coding scores 
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